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ABSTRACT 
High Performance Computing facilities that use cluster computing to provide computational 
services to scientists and engineers have become widespread, with such facilities available at most 
major research universities worldwide, as well as in government and industrial research settings. 
Until recently HPC facilities have largely neglected security, or at the very least treated security as 
an afterthought in a world where performance is the number one priority. 
In this paper we present a security architecture, and associated security best practices, for high 
performance computing facilities. Our architecture aims to address concerns about HPC security 
raised in the literature [1-4], and specifically to mitigate the risks identified in the leading threat 
model for cluster computing [5], developed at the National Center for Supercomputing 
Applications. 
Our architecture and best practices attempt to provide the best tradeoff between adequate 
security measures and high performance. We also consider privacy and intellectual property issues, 
and how shared HPC facilities may put measures in place to convince their users that their data is 
protected from both external threats and internal, authorized cluster users not affiliated with their 
projects. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
High performance computing (HPC) facilities have seen increasing deployment in recent years, and 
in particular the rise of HPC facilities using clusters has been remarkable. Since 1998, when cluster 
computers first broke into the top 500 supercomputer list [6], their growth has been enormous: 
clusters now account for 72% of the top 500 supercomputers worldwide. Since cluster computers 
typically use standard PC hardware, and modified versions of standard desktop and server operating 
systems, they offer much better value for money than their proprietary, custom-designed 
supercomputer contemporaries. However, their use of standard hardware and software also makes 
them vulnerable to standard security attacks. Yurcik et. al. in [1] also argue that cluster security has 
“emergent properties”, and should be studied in its own right. 
In the high performance computing community the primary goal for the design of a high 
performance computing facility is to obtain the maximum performance within the allowed budget. 
All other considerations are secondary. This mentality is exacerbated by the fact that many users, 
and managers, of HPC facilities are not computer scientists, but rather engineers and scientists from 
other disciplines who rightly view such facilities as tools, rather than as subjects for research in 
their own right. Much research in computer science has been done on the performance aspects of 
computational clusters, but until recently [1, 5] the field has largely neglected security. 
In [5], Mogilevsky et. al. provide a comprehensive threat model for HPC clusters. We present 
a proposed architecture that aims to mitigate many of the risks outlined in their model, whilst 
minimizing the effects on the performance of the cluster. 
This paper is organized as follows: we first review previous work relating to threats to HPC 
facilities. We then introduce a proposed architecture, and explain our design choices. We offer best 
practices relating to the setup and maintenance of various sections in the architecture, where 
appropriate. Finally, we briefly review the existing tools that are available to aid in implementing 
the proposed architecture. 
2 THREATS TO HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTING CLUSTERS 
HPC clusters are attractive targets to attackers for several reasons. Since clusters by their very 
nature have impressive processing capabilities, an attacker may wish to illegally take advantage of 
this power. Mogilevsky et. al. [5] give the example of brute force password cracking. However, 
other uses of the computational power of a cluster that might appeal to attackers can certainly be 
imagined; for example, digital video encoding is computationally expensive and an attacker could 
use a cluster to encode counterfeit videos. HPC clusters also typically have very large storage 
facilities, as well as high bandwidth Internet connections. Together these features make HPC 
clusters attractive targets for attackers to set up illegitimate FTP servers on. An effective Denial-of-
Service attack could also be launched from a compromised cluster [5]. In 2004 attackers struck the 
TeraGrid network [7], which served as a reminder that research facilities are valued targets, and are 
vulnerable. 
Mogilevsky et. al. [5] proceed to define a threat model for HPC clusters in three steps. 
Broadly, they identify assets in HPC clusters, identify potential entry points for attack and finally 
describe what attacks can be launched to gain illegitimate access to each asset. They use the 
Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) threat classification. The following are identified as 
assets: user login data, user job data, system logs, scheduler, storage systems, intranode network 
fabric, computing cycles and network packets. The entry points are identified as: vulnerabilities in 
  
remote login systems (e.g. SSH), remote cluster management software, open ports, stolen login 
information and rootkits. 
Confidentiality is important to most users, but is a crucial concern in shared HPC facilities 
that make their resources available to industry. The WestGrid facility in Canada has noted that 
some companies are reluctant to used shared facilities such as theirs, citing competitive concerns – 
companies working on the same problem understandably don’t want to share computing resources 
for fear of corporate espionage [8] unless they have guarantees on their data safety. For HPC 
centres wanting to serve industrial clients, ensuring confidentiality of user data is just as important 
as securing hardware resources. 
Mogilevsky et. al. [5] identify five areas where confidentiality may be compromised: 
snooping on the internal and external networks to illegitimately obtain data and control packets; 
scheduler compromise, resulting in access to scheduler logs; direct access to computational nodes, 
allowing the attacker to launch jobs without using the scheduler, and access to the cluster’s storage 
resources. 
Integrity is similarly important in HPC centres: just a small amount of corrupt data can render 
thousands of hours worth of computations worthless, or worse still, cause erroneous results that the 
user assumes are correct. Mogilevsky et. al. identify several means by which an attacker can affect 
the integrity of the cluster: internal network packet injection, whereby packets with incorrect data 
are sent to nodes in the network; log tampering, effectively allowing the attacker to modify users’ 
quotas, and data tampering, whereby an attacker with access to the storage resources can modify 
user data. 
Ideally one would like an HPC facility to have 100% availability, but even though this might 
not be possible due to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, it is certainly undesirable to have a 
cluster unavailable as a result of an attack. Besides “conventional” Denial-of-Service attacks on a 
cluster’s outward-facing scheduling mechanism, a sufficiently successful attacker can also cause 
reduced availability by the following methods [5]: exhausting log space; exhausting space allocated 
per node for temporary data; exhausting storage space, and scheduling junk jobs to run on the 
cluster, thus wasting cycles while legitimate users wait for their jobs to be scheduled. 
Despite the considerable threats against HPC clusters, and the importance of their resources, 
there is very little guidance in the literature on how to architect clusters with an eye towards 
security, nor what specific security measures can be put in place to mitigate the risks posed by the 
threats. 
3 A PROPOSED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND RECOMMENDED SECURITY 
PRACTICES 
When designing a computer network, security should ordinarily be taken into account, so calling a 
network architecture a “security architecture” is a tautology. However, as we have already noted, 
research in cluster and high performance computing has been focused on performance, so we 
denote our proposed architecture for a cluster as a “security architecture” to emphasise our focus on 
creating a network architecture for HPC clusters that addresses some of the security issues relevant 
to such networks. 
Figure 1 shows our proposed architecture for a heterogeneous computational cluster. We have 
relied heavily on the principle of security-by-isolation, and encourage the use of access control 
mechanisms wherever possible. 
Users are separated from the cluster by a firewall, and only have direct access to a server 
hosting a web-based front-end for submitting jobs, obtaining results and viewing billing details. The 
firewall will block the user from accessing any machines other than the web server, and on any 
ports other than those required for web access, and possibly temporary file transfer, as the web 
  
server acts as an intermediary between the user and the storage server when the user uploads input 
data or downloads output results from the cluster. 
 
 
Figure 1. A security architecture for a computational cluster 
  
Users will have SSL-protected sessions with the web server, thus mitigating the risk of 
external attackers snooping on the public networks to view packets sent between users and the 
cluster facility. All users using the web server will be required to authenticate first. Any user 
request mediated by the web front-end would require that the user has sufficient access rights and is 
thus authorized to perform the requested operation. One server is responsible for authentication, 
authorization and billing. Its connections with the other servers on the internal network will be 
encrypted. An example of a similar system in deployment at Fermilab in Chicago is the use of 
Microsoft Windows Active Directory to store user data, and the use of Kerberos to authenticate 
users [9]. All Fermilab users are issued with certificates, and no passwords are sent over the 
network. Certificates are given short lifetimes based on the premises that if they are kept for to 
long, they have an increasing risk of being tampered with or otherwise cracked, and that generating 
certificates can be done fast enough to serve a large number of users using this scheme. 
Often large HPC facilities have several clusters, each using a different machine architecture. 
For example, there may be an x64 cluster, and a cluster of Sun UltraSparc RISC machines. In 
general clusters consisting of different machine architectures aren’t used together. We advocate 
isolating the various clusters within an HPC facility: two clusters are shown in figure 1, and both 
have completely separate connections to the scheduler and storage. This may help to reduce the risk 
that if one cluster is compromised due to a security problem for that particular set of machines and 
their software, the rest of the facility is vulnerable. 
Network traffic between infrastructure equipment in a facility (i.e. front-end, scheduler, 
directory services, storage and head nodes) can generally be encrypted without incurring an 
unreasonable performance penalty. Even an attacker who has gained some limited access to the 
internal networks will then not be able to breach confidentiality by snooping. However, encrypting 
traffic between the compute nodes in the clusters will typically result in unsatisfactory performance 
– parallel programs often make heavy use of message passing communication between compute 
nodes, and so the overhead of encrypting each message will dramatically reduce efficiency. Of 
course, “embarrassingly parallel” programs (those that are easily divided into parallel tasks, with 
little or no dependence amongst those tasks) may not require much inter-node communication and 
so encrypting traffic may be viable, and it may be useful to allow the concerned user the option of 
encrypting inter-node traffic. However, given that encryption may not be viable, the next best 
option is to isolate the network fabric between compute nodes and the head node. Set up the 
interconnect system as a private network: this way a snooping attacker will have to have access to 
one of the compute nodes, or the head node, to view traffic sent between these machines. If this is 
the case, the fact that the attacker can sniff traffic will be a lesser worry. 
During parallel computations, compute nodes typically provide a “scratch space” where local 
processes can store data. Depending on how often the processes need to access or write to this 
storage space, it may be viable to encrypt data in the scratch space (perhaps by making use of built-
in encrypted file system features in the node’s operating system). However, the effect of this local 
encryption on performance will be highly dependent on the behaviour of the executing program. 
Users can choose to use an encrypted scratch space if they are sufficiently concerned about the 
privacy of their data. As noted in figure 1, it may also be viable to encrypt the traffic between 
compute nodes and the central storage server(s). 
The storage server is key and needs to be properly protected. At a minimum, each user should 
have an isolated space on the server and only be allowed access to his files. However, this will 
likely not satisfy users with competitive concerns: giving such users the option to encrypt their data 
is essential. 
To make the storage space in a cluster facility less attractive to attackers we suggest limiting 
the number of connections allowed to access files in any single directory. If an arbitrary limit of, 
say, 10 connections per directory are allowed, this should be enough that legitimate users aren’t 
hindered, but attackers can no longer viably use the cluster storage resources as a means for 
  
distributing material to many other parties. The storage server should be configured to only allow 
access to the web server and compute nodes, and not external machines. The requirement that 
storage requests be mediated by the web front-end may make attacking and subverting the storage 
server more difficult. 
Another crucial component that needs adequate protection is the scheduler, and the 
scheduling capability. External attackers may wish to steal CPU cycles by illegitimately accessing 
the scheduler, and internal users may wish to subvert the billing mechanism to steal cycles. The 
scheduler is hidden from the outside world by a firewall, as is the rest of the facilities computing 
equipment. It should require that the user impersonated by the web front-end server, through which 
users submit jobs, be properly authenticated by the appropriate server. Job submissions should only 
be accepted by the scheduler from the web server. Likewise the head nodes should only accept 
instructions from the scheduler. 
4 EXISTING TOOLS AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR SECURING HPC CLUSTERS 
There are many existing tools designed for securing “ordinary” networks that are appropriate for 
use with HPC clusters. In addition, tools designed to enable secure “grid computing” can often be 
readily used in a cluster environment. 
Standard firewall, directory services, encrypted file system, web server and network 
management software is readily available for computers used in clusters. Almost by definition 
clusters in recent years have used standard hardware, and so no special modifications to much of 
the software made for standard PC’s is necessary. In addition, the Globus Toolkit [10], developed 
as a basic piece of infrastructure for grid computing networks, is well-suited to providing several 
mechanisms necessary in an HPC cluster facility: communication, authentication, network 
information and data access. Furthermore, Globus is designed to make extensive use of web 
services, exposing services in this way, which makes it a suitable choice for partially implementing 
our web server front-end suggestion. While Globus may not cover all areas, its use can certainly 
jumpstart the development of systems when setting up a cluster facility. 
5 CONCLUSION 
A cluster can never be made completely secure without crippling its functionality. However, we 
believe our proposals represent a reasonable compromise between security, performance and user 
convenience. Many of the standard techniques and tools for security in standard computing 
environments can be easily and appropriately adapted to secure aspects of cluster facilities. 
However, instead of simply focusing on securing individual machines and treating the cluster 
merely as a network of computers, if one takes into consideration the broader view of a cluster and 
its functionality, more appropriate choices for security mechanisms to be used can be made. Our 
proposed architecture is designed based on this premise, yet also allows for the use of standard 
security tools, and those being developed more recently for Grid computing, in its implementation. 
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